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shortcomings is ours. 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Technological progress is the leading force of economic growth. For technological progress to
occur not only the discovery of new technologies but also their adoption, that is, the deployment
of technological advances in ﬁrms’ products and production processes, is crucial.
Empirical observations (see e.g., Griliches, 1957, Mansﬁeld, 1968 and 1985, Stoneman,
1983) indicate that new technologies are adopted by ﬁrms with delay and that they are diﬀused
over time. A prominent example is the adoption of basic oxygen furnace (BOF) in the process
of steel-making (Hoppe, 2002). Although BOF was discovered in 1949, it was not until 1964
that it was ﬁrst adopted by a U.S. steel producing ﬁrm. The rest of the steel producing
ﬁrms adopted BOF after 1964. Another example is the adoption of e-commerce technology
in retailing. The adoption rates of e-commerce vary considerably not only among retailers of
diﬀerent product categories but also among retailers operating in the same product market
(Dinlersoz and Pereira, 2007).
In this paper, we explore how product market competition inﬂuences ﬁrms’ timing of tech-
nology adoption. We allow for product diﬀerentiation and for competition both in quantities
and in prices. We compare adoption patterns obtained under alternative modes of competition
as well as with those that are socially optimal.
We use a framework in which two competing ﬁrms that initially employ the same production
technology consider adopting a new cost-reducing technology that has appeared in the market.
If a ﬁrm adopts the technology before its rival, it will enjoy a competitive advantage. If a
ﬁrm waits, it will incur lower technology adoption costs due to either economies of learning
or basic research adoption process innovations. We analyze what happens both when ﬁrms
can precommit to their adoption dates - precommitment game- and when ﬁrms are ﬂexible in
altering their adoption plans - preemption game.
We show that the speed of technology adoption is crucially related to and shaped by the
market features, most notably by the mode of market competition. In particular, the speed
of technology adoption diﬀers not only among similar ﬁrms - i.e. there is technology diﬀusion
in equilibrium - but also among markets with Cournot and Bertrand competition. In fact,
Cournot competition leads to earlier ﬁrst adoption than Bertrand competition when ﬁrms can
precommit to their adoption dates and their products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. Intu-
itively, under Cournot competition, technology adoption increases the adopter’s own output
1and decreases its rival’s output. Thus, technology adoption has a positive strategic eﬀect that
increases its attractiveness. In contrast, under Bertrand competition the strategic eﬀect of
adoption is negative since adoption decreases not only the adopter’s price but also the price
of its rival, diminishing thus adoption incentives. There is, however, an additional eﬀect at
play. The output eﬀect that captures the fact that a ﬁrm has stronger adoption incentives
when the cost-reduction applies to a larger production volume. The output eﬀect is stronger
under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. Competition is ﬁercer when it takes place in
prices and as a consequence the increase in a ﬁrm’s output due to adoption is more drastic in
this case. When the products are diﬀerentiated enough, the output eﬀect is insigniﬁcant and
the strategic eﬀect leads to earlier ﬁrst adoption under Cournot competition. When instead
the products become closer substitutes and thus the competition gets ﬁercer, the output eﬀect
becomes more prominent and dominates the strategic eﬀect. Interestingly, Cournot competi-
tion encourages more than Bertrand competition the technology adoption by the second ﬁrm
too. This holds independently of product substitutability and of whether or not ﬁrms can
precommit to their adoptions dates. In other words, the strategic eﬀect always dominates the
output eﬀect for the second adopter.
The above ﬁndings point out that more competition does not necessarily lead to earlier
technology adoption. This conclusion is reinforced by our results regarding the role of product
substitutability. We ﬁnd that when ﬁrms can precommit to their adoption dates, the rela-
tionship between competition intensity, measured by product substitutability, and the ﬁrst
ﬁrm’s adoption incentives is U-shaped. Therefore, competition, measured either as an increase
in product substitutability or as a shift from Cournot to Bertrand competition, encourages
technology adoption only when products are suﬃciently close substitutes. Intuitively, more
competition means lower pre-adoption and post-adoption proﬁts, and thus lower adoption in-
centives. However, more competition also means larger competitive advantage for the ﬁrm
which is the only adopter for some period of time. When the products are close substitutes,
the latter positive eﬀect of competition gets stronger. It dominates the negative eﬀect and
accelerates the ﬁrst adoption. Regarding the second adoption, we ﬁnd that an increase in prod-
uct substitutability and thus an intensiﬁcation of competition typically weakens the adoption
incentives.
From a welfare perspective, our analysis shows that ﬁrms sometimes adopt the new technol-
ogy too fast. This holds for the ﬁrst adoption when ﬁrms cannot precommit to their adoption
2dates and the products are close substitutes. It also holds for the second adoption when the
new technology is not too drastic and the products are close substitutes. In all other cases, the
speed of technology adoption is too slow relative to the social optimum. Interestingly, these
results are qualitatively similar under Cournot and Bertrand competition. Thus, the optimal
policy towards technology adoption, subsidization or taxation, should not depend on the mode
of market competition. Still, the optimal level of subsidy or tax should depend on the mode of
market competition as well as on whether products are close substitutes, how drastic the new
technology is and whether the adoption plans can change easily.
The analysis of ﬁrms’ timing of technology adoption has attracted wide attention in the
industrial organization literature (see e.g., Reinganum, 1981a&b and 1983a&b, Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1985, Hendricks, 1992, Riordan, 1992, Gotz, 1999 and 2000, Hoppe and Lehmann-
Grube, 2001, Ruiz-Aliseda and Zemsky, 2006). This literature has considered one market
structure, typically characterized by homogenous products and competition in quantities. In
such a market, Reinganum (1981a, 1983a&b) was the ﬁrst to demonstrate that a new tech-
nology is diﬀused over time assuming that ﬁrms can precommit to speciﬁc adoption dates
(precommitment). Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), moving to the opposite extreme where ﬁrms
can observe and react instantaneously to their rivals’ adoptions, demonstrated that ﬁrms’
proﬁts are equalized in equilibrium since each ﬁrm adopts preemptively to prevent, or delay,
adoption by its opponent (preemption).1 Considering both precommitment and preemption,
we extend the literature by examining how market competition aﬀects the timing of technology
adoption and showing that the speed of technology adoption diﬀe r sa c r o s sm a r k e t s .A sp o i n t e d
out by Hoppe (2002), the technology adoption literature has paid far too little attention to
welfare issues and public policies. We ﬁll this gap by performing an in depth welfare analysis
that allows us to examine the circumstances under which policy intervention is desirable as
well as the form that such intervention should take.
Our work is also related to the literature that explores the impact of competition on inno-
vation. The ﬁndings of this literature are quite mixed. For instance, Qiu (1997), Symeonidis
(2003) and Hinloopen and Vandekerckhove (2007), considering an oligopolistic market, have
demonstrated that a shift from a more competitive market characterized by Bertrand compe-
tition to a less competitive market with Cournot competition can reinforce ﬁrms’ incentives to
1Reinganum (1989) and Hoppe (2001) provide an excellent survey of this literature.
3invest in R&D. Sacco (2008) and Tishler and Milstein (2009), also considering an oligopolistic
market but using product substitutability as a measure of competition, have found that there
is a U-shaped relationship between competition and ﬁrms’ investments in cost-reducing R&D.
Aghion et al. (2006) instead, in a general equilibrium setting where competition is measured
in terms of the Lerner index, have concluded that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship
between competition and innovation. None of these papers has dealt with technology adoption
and thus it has not examined the role of market competition on technology diﬀusion patterns.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the model and
analyze product market competition. In Section 3, the market adoption patterns under both
Cournot and Bertrand competition are analyzed and compared among them. In Section 4, the
socially optimal adoption pattern is derived and compared with the market adoption patterns.
Section 5 includes some concluding remarks. All the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model Description and Product Market Competition
We consider an economy with an imperfectly competitive sector, consisting of two ﬁrms, de-
noted by i, i =1 ,2, that produce diﬀerentiated goods, and a competitive numeraire sector.
There is a representative consumer in the economy with the following utility:




1 +2 γq1q2 + q2
2)+M, i,j =1 ,2, i 6= j, 0 <γ<1,( 1 )
where qi and qj are respectively ﬁrm i’s and ﬁrm j’s output, and M is the numeraire good.
The parameter γ denotes the degree of product substitutability. Namely, the higher is γ,t h e
closer substitutes the products of the two ﬁrms are. Since the utility function is separable
and linear in the numeraire good, there are no income eﬀects and we can perform a partial
equilibrium analysis. More speciﬁcally, the maximization problem of the representative con-
sumer, max(qi,qj) U(qi,q j)−piqi−pjqj, gives rise to the following demand and inverse demand
functions for ﬁrm i:
qi =
(a − pi) − γ(a − pj)
1 − γ2 ; (2)
pi = a − qi − γqj.( 3 )
We assume that time is continuous, denoted by t ≥ 0, and that the horizon is inﬁnite. Ini-
4tially, the two ﬁrms operate in the market with the same technology, facing the same marginal
production cost ci = c,w i t ha>c>0. A new cost-reducing technology becomes available
i nt h em a r k e ta td a t et =0 .I f ﬁrm i adopts the new technology at t ≥ 0 then its marginal
production cost reduces from ci = c to ci = c−∆,w i t h0 < ∆ <c , thereafter. As standard in
the literature, we assume that no further technical advances are anticipated in the market.
The discounted cost of adopting the new technology at date t is given by k(t).T h i s
cost includes both the present value of the cost of purchasing the new technology and the
adjustment cost of bringing the new technology on line at date t. The “current cost” of
bringing the new technology on line by date t is given by k(t)ert,w h e r er,w i t h0 <r<1,i st h e
interest rate. Following Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) and most of the subsequent literature,
we assume that the current cost of adoption decreases over time at a decreasing rate, i.e.,
(k(t)ert)0 < 0 and (k(t)ert)00 > 0. The decrease in the adoption cost can be due to either
economies of learning or new results from basic research that facilitate the adoption process.
Furthermore, we assume that limt→0 k(t)=−limt→0 k0(t)=∞ and limt→∞ k0(t)ert =0in
order to guarantee respectively that the immediate technology adoption is prohibitively costly
and that all technology adoptions occur in ﬁnite time under all parameter conﬁgurations.2
We consider two alternative technology adoption games. In the ﬁr s tg a m et h a to r i g i n a t e s
from Reinganum (1981a&b), each ﬁrm i precommits at t =0t oas p e c i ﬁc adoption date Ti,
that captures the time by which its adoption will be completed. The two ﬁrms then compete
in the product market, either in quantities or in prices, each period t over an inﬁnite horizon.
We refer to this game as the precommitment game since it captures the idea that in order to
bring the new technology on line a ﬁrm often has to make long term plans. It is important to
note that precommitment at t =0is a time consistent behavior only if the costs of altering the
adoption plans are prohibitively high and thus the threat of altering one’s adoption date as a
response to the rival’s past actions is not credible. An alternative justiﬁcation for this game is
the existence of inﬁnitely long information lags.
In the second game, based on Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), a ﬁrm cannot credibly commit
to maintain its adoption date regardless of what happened in the past. This could be so
because the costs of altering adoption plans are not signiﬁcant or the information lags are
negligible. We refer to this game as the preemption game since as demonstrated by Fudenberg
2It should be noted that the latter assumption is not crucial for our results. It only serves to avoid the
complications of corner solutions.
5and Tirole (1985), when ﬁrms can observe and react to their rival’s actions, they have incentives
for "preemptive adoption", that is, ﬁrms adopt sooner than they would adopt if their rivals’
adoption dates were ﬁxed.
In what follows, we analyze the product market competition, given ﬁrms’ technology adop-
tion decisions.
Cournot Competition
When product market competition takes place in quantities each ﬁrm i chooses its quantity qi
in order to maximize its per-period gross (from the adoption cost) proﬁts:
Max
qi
πi(qi,q j,c i,c j)=( a − qi − γqj)qi − ciqi.( 4 )
This results in the per-period equilibrium ﬁrms’ quantities and gross proﬁts:
qC
i (ci,c j)=
2(a − ci) − γ(a − cj)
(4 − γ2)
; πC
i (ci,c j)=[ qi(ci,c j)]2. (5)
It is important to note that ﬁrm i’s adoption of the cost-reducing technology increases its own
quantity qC
i and decreases its rival’s quantity qC
j . The latter eﬀect is strategically advantageous
for ﬁrm i because, as it can bee seen from (3), its own price is negatively related to ﬁrm j’s
quantity. Thus, under Cournot competition technology adoption has a positive strategic eﬀect.
Bertrand Competition
When product market competition takes place in prices each ﬁrm i chooses its price pi in order
to maximize its per-period gross proﬁts:
Max
pi
πi(pi,p j,c i,c j)=( pi − ci)
(a − pi) − γ(a − pj)
1 − γ2 .( 6 )
This gives rise to the per-period equilibrium ﬁrms’ prices and gross proﬁts:
pB
i (ci,c j)=





i (ci,c j) − ci]2
(1 − γ2)
(7)
Observe that when ﬁrm i adopts the cost-reducing technology then both its own price pB
i and
the price of its rival pB
j decrease. The latter is disadvantageous for ﬁrm i since its quantity is
positively related to pj. In contrast then to Cournot competition, under Bertrand competition
the strategic eﬀect of technology adoption is negative.
6In order to avoid corner solutions, and in particular, in order to guarantee that both
ﬁrms are active in the market in all the cases under consideration, we assume the following
throughout the paper:
Assumption 1: γ<γ B(δ),w h e r eγB(δ)=[ −(1 + δ)+
p
8+( 1+δ)2]/2,w i t hδ ≡ ∆/A and
A ≡ a − c.
3 Firms’ Optimal Adoption Timing
In this Section, we examine ﬁrms’ optimal adoption dates. By convention and without loss
of generality, we assume throughout that if ﬁrms adopt the new technology sequentially then
ﬁrm 1 is the one that adopts it ﬁrst.
3.1 Precommitment Game
We start by analyzing the game in which each ﬁrm i can precommit at t =0to its adoption
date, Tm
i ,w i t hm = C when there is Cournot competition in the market and m = B when
there is Bertrand competition.
At t =0 , ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 choose T1 and T2 respectively in order to maximize their
































b e−rtdt − k(T2), (9)
where πm
0 ≡ πm(c,c) denotes ﬁrm i’s per-period gross proﬁts when none of the ﬁrms has
adopted the new technology and πm
b ≡ πm(c − ∆,c− ∆) denotes its proﬁts when both ﬁrms
have adopted the new technology. Respectively, πm
l ≡ πm(c − ∆,c) and πm
f ≡ πm(c,c − ∆)
denote the per-period gross proﬁts of the ﬁrm that has already adopted the technology - the
leader - and the ﬁrm that has not yet adopted the technology - the follower.




















f . It follows from (10) that the optimal adoption dates, Tm
1
and Tm
2 , equalize ﬁrms’ incremental beneﬁts from adoption to the marginal cost of waiting.




(4 − γ2)2 ; (11)
IC
2 =
4δA2[(2 − γ)+δ(1 − γ)]
(4 − γ2)2 . (12)
From (7) we obtain the respective incremental beneﬁts under Bertrand competition:
IB
1 =
δ(2 − γ2)A2[2(1 − γ)(2 + γ)+δ(2 − γ2)]
(1 − γ2)(4 − γ2)2 ; (13)
IB
2 =
δ(2 − γ2)A2[2(1 − γ)(2 + γ)+δ(2 − γ2 − 2γ)]
(1 − γ2)(4 − γ2)2 . (14)
Two observations are in order. First, Im
i > 0.T h a t i s , a ﬁrm always has incentives to
adopt the new technology. Second, Im
1 >I m
2 . This means that the ﬁrst adoption leads to
more incremental beneﬁts than the second adoption. From this and our assumptions on k(.),
it follows immediately that in the equilibrium of the precommitment game ﬁrms’ optimal
adoption dates are such that Tm
1 <T m
2 . In other words, there is technology diﬀusion in
equilibrium. As we can see and as it was pointed out also by Quimbach (1986), the diﬀusion
of the new technology in the market arises not from strategic behavior but rather from the
declining incremental beneﬁts of adoption and the decreasing adoption cost.
In line with the above, in order to compare ﬁrms’ optimal adoption dates it is suﬃcient
to compare their respective incremental beneﬁts. Taking this into account, next we compare
ﬁrms’ adoption dates under Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Proposition 1 In the equilibrium of the precommitment game,
(i) there exists γ1(δ) ≡ 2/(2 + δ),w i t hdγ1/dδ < 0, such that TC
1 <T B
1 if γ<γ 1(δ) and
TC
1 >TB




According to Proposition 1(i), the new technology is adopted earlier under Cournot com-
petition rather than under Bertrand competition when the products are relatively poor sub-
stitutes. The opposite occurs when products are close enough substitutes. The intuition is
8as follows. Technology adoption gives rise to two main eﬀects. The ﬁrst eﬀect is the already
mentioned strategic eﬀect. Since this eﬀect is positive under Cournot competition but negative
under Bertrand competition, it reinforces the technology adoption incentives under Cournot
competition and weakens them under Bertrand competition. The second eﬀect is the output
eﬀect which refers to the fact that the higher is a ﬁrm’s output the larger is its gain from
adopting a cost-reducing technology (Bester and Petrakis, 1993). Since competition is more
intense when it takes place in prices, the increase in a ﬁrm’s output due to technology adoption
is more drastic then and the output eﬀect is stronger under Bertrand competition rather than
under Cournot competition. In fact, when the products are poor substitutes their demands
are hardly related and the ﬁrms’ output hardly diﬀer under the two modes of market competi-
tion. This means that the output eﬀect is insigniﬁcant then and the strategic eﬀect dominates.
Instead, when the products are too close substitutes, technology adoption by ﬁrm 1 reduces
ﬁrm 2’s output to almost zero under Bertrand competition. The respective reduction in ﬁrm
2’s output is much less drastic under Cournot competition. Therefore, when products are close
substitutes the strategic eﬀect is dominated by the output eﬀect.
Regarding the second adoption, as Proposition 1(ii) states, it always takes place earlier
under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. Clearly, this means that for the
second adopter the strategic eﬀect dominates the output eﬀect independently of the degree of
product substitutability. When the products are poor substitutes the intuition is the same as
the respective one for the ﬁrst adoption. When the products are close substitutes the inten-
sity of Bertrand competition diminishes the output eﬀect. More speciﬁcally, under Bertrand
competition the post-adoption proﬁts of the second adopter do not increase much, even if its
output does increase a lot. This is due to the ﬁerce competition between ﬁrms that are produc-
ing very similar goods. The post-adoption competition is much softer for the second adopter
under Cournot competition. As a result, its proﬁts increase suﬃciently despite the fact that
its output increases much less than for the second adopter under Bertrand competition.
It should be stressed that in the equilibrium of the precommitment game, not only the
adoption dates of the two initially identical ﬁrms diﬀer but also their proﬁts diﬀer, i.e., the
discounted sum of ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts exceed the respective proﬁts of ﬁrm 2. Thus, there is an
early-mover advantage under both Cournot and Bertrand competition.
Next, we study how product diﬀerentiation inﬂuences ﬁrms’ technology adoption incentives.
9Proposition 2 In the equilibrium of the precommitment game,
(i) Tm
1 increases in γ if γ<γ m
2 (δ), with dγm
2 /dδ < 0 and decreases in γ otherwise,
(ii) TB
2 always increases in γ,
(iii) TC
2 increases in γ, except if γ is large enough and δ is small enough.
It follows from Proposition 2(i) that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the
degree of product substitutability and the optimal timing of the ﬁrst adoption. This means in
turn that the relationship between competition intensity, measured by product substitutability,
and the investments in technology adoption is U-shaped. When goods are poor substitutes
(γ<γ m
2 )a ni n c r e a s ei nγ and thus an increase in competition leads to a later ﬁrst adoption.
Instead, when goods are close substitutes (γ>γ m
2 )a n dγ increases the ﬁrst adoption occurs
earlier. A similar ﬁnding is included in Proposition 1(i) where we saw that a shift from Cournot
to Bertrand competition, which can also be considered as an increase in competition, leads
to earlier ﬁrst adoption only when goods are close substitutes (γ>γ 1) and to later adoption
when they are diﬀerentiated enough (γ<γ 1). Therefore, competition, measured either as
an increase in product substitutability or as a shift from Cournot to Bertrand competition,
encourages technology adoption when goods are suﬃciently close substitutes. Intuitively, an
increase in competition has two countervailing eﬀects. First, more competition means lower
proﬁts, both pre-adoption and post-adoption, and thus lower adoption incentives. Second, as
competition increases and only one of the ﬁrms has adopted the new technology, its ability
to exploit its cost advantage by discouraging its rival’s production becomes more pronounced.
The second eﬀect, which reinforces the adoption incentives, is stronger when goods are close
substitutes, accelerating the adoption. When instead the goods are poor substitutes, the same
positive eﬀect is weaker and the ﬁrst, negative, eﬀect, dominates and adoption slows-down.
Regarding the second adoption, more competition measured as a shift from Cournot to
Bertrand competition (Proposition 1(ii)) weakens the technology adoption incentives of ﬁrm 2.
The same occurs when more competition is captured by an increase in product substitutability
(Proposition 2(ii) and (iii)) unless there is Cournot competition, the new technology is non-
drastic and the goods are too close substitutes. As above the negative impact of competition
intensity is driven by the lower proﬁt margin. Note that the observed exception under Cournot
competition is mainly due to the fact that, for high enough γ, the leader-ﬁrm 1 adopts earlier
as γ increases (Proposition 2(i)). This latter eﬀect is though not as strong under Bertrand
10competition and TB
2 always increases with γ.
The above ﬁndings are clearly related to the literature that examines the interplay be-
tween competition and innovation. They contra s tw i t ht h ew e l lk n o w nr e s u l to fA g h i o ne ta l .
(2006) according to which there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between competition and
innovation. Aghion et al. (2006) have obtained their result in a general equilibrium setting,
measuring competition in terms of the Lerner index and innovation in terms of the number of
patents. More recently, Sacco (2008) and Tishler and Milstein (2009), in line with us, have
provided theoretical support to the U-shaped relationship between competition measured as an
increase in product substitutability and ﬁrms’ investments in cost-reducing R&D. Qiu (1997),
Symeonidis (2003) and Hinloopen and Vandekerckhove (2007) also considering an oligopolis-
tic setting have demonstrated that a shift from Cournot to Bertrand competition discourages
ﬁrms’ cost-reducing R&D investments.3
3.2 Preemption Game
We examine now ﬁrms’ optimal adoption dates when they are unable to credibly commit to
their adoption dates at t =0 . As demonstrated by Fudenberg and Tirole, in contrast to the
precommitment game, both ﬁrms obtain in the preemption game the same level of discounted
sum of proﬁts in equilibrium. The intuition is straightforward. Due to the potentially higher
proﬁts for the ﬁrst than for the second adopter, ﬁrm 2 has incentives to adopt the new technol-
ogy just before ﬁrm 1.F i r m1, anticipating this, adopts the new technology at an earlier date
such that ﬁrm 2 is indiﬀerent between adopting just before or much after that date. In other
words, the potential early-mover advantage stimulates preemption until payoﬀs are equalized
across ﬁrms and the early-mover advantage disappears in equilibrium.
Under this setting, there is always a technology diﬀusion equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
once ﬁrm 1 has adopted the new technology ﬁrm 2’s adoption decision is a one-player decision
problem. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrm 2 chooses τm
2 in order to maximize its proﬁts Πm
2 (τ1,τ2)
which are obtained after substituting Ti by τi in (9). The ﬁrst-order condition that arises
is the same as the one in the precommitment game and is given by (10) with τm
2 replacing
Tm
2 . This implies that ﬁrm 2 adopts the technology at the same date in the equilibrium of the
preemption game and the precommitment game, i.e., τm
2 = Tm
2 . In order to determine ﬁrm
3The empirical evidence on the impact of competition on innovation (see e.g., Sherer, 1967, Aghion et al.,
2006, Mansﬁeld, 1968, Kraft, 1989, Blundell et al., 1999, Geroski, 1995, Nickell, 1996) are also mixed.
111’s optimal adoption date, τm


















As it can be seen ﬁrm 1’s optimal adoption date depends only on the diﬀerence between the
per-period proﬁts of the leader and the follower, πm
l −πm
f . Following Katz and Shapiro (1987),
we refer to this diﬀerence as ﬁrm 1’s per-period preemptive incentives. A comparison of the
per-period preemptive incentives under Bertrand and Cournot competition is included in the
next Lemma.





f , and they are increasing in γ.
Interestingly, ﬁrm 1’s preemptive incentives are the same under Bertrand and Cournot
competition. Intuitively, there are two opposite forces in action that counterbalance each
other. First, competition in prices is ﬁercer than competition in quantities. This means that
the diﬀerence in the proﬁts of the low-cost leader and the high-cost follower is larger under
Bertrand competition and thus that the preemptive incentives of ﬁrm 1 are stronger under
Bertrand competition. Second, the leader’s adoption generates positive externalities for the
follower under Bertrand competition, but negative externalities under Cournot competition.
T h i sm e a n si nt u r nt h a tﬁrm 1 has stronger per-period preemptive incentives under Cournot
than under Bertrand competition.
Next, we compare ﬁrms’ optimal adoption dates under Bertrand and Cournot competition.







Driven by Lemma 1 one might be tempted to claim that the mode of product market
competition, Cournot or Bertrand, does not aﬀect the preemptive incentives. However, ac-
c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n3 ( i ) ,ﬁrm 1’s overall incentives to preempt are stronger under Bertrand
than under Cournot competition. In fact, the ﬁrst adopter enjoys the leadership longer under
Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition since the second adoption, just like in
12the precommitment game, takes place later under Bertrand competition (Proposition 3(ii)).
The intuition is as follows. Since ﬁrm’s per-period preemptive incentives are the same under
Bertrand and Cournot competition, the proﬁtd i ﬀerential of the leader and the follower is also





τ2 increases, i.e., as the follower adopts the technology later, the leader enjoys the competitive
advantage longer and as a consequence the proﬁtd i ﬀerential increases. Since τB
2 >τ C
2 ,i t
follows that the proﬁtd i ﬀerential would be larger under Bertrand than under Cournot compe-
tition as long as τB
1 = τC
1 . On the other hand, as τm
1 increases, the proﬁtd i ﬀerential increases
because the leader saves on adoption costs. Therefore, for proﬁt equalization to occur in equi-




Proposition 4 below includes our ﬁndings regarding the impact of product diﬀerentiation
on ﬁrm 1’s adoption dates.
Proposition 4 In the technology diﬀusion equilibrium of the preemption game,
(i) τB
1 decreases in γ,
(ii) τC
1 decreases in γ when δ is suﬃciently high as well as when γ is suﬃciently low.
Combining Propositions 3(i) and 4(i) we conclude that in the preemption game, more
competition, measured either as a shift from Cournot to Bertrand competition or as an increase
in γ, leads to earlier adoption for ﬁrm 1 and thus to stronger technology adoption incentives.4
An increase in the intensity of competition, exerts more pressure on the leader to exploit its
cost advantage before the follower does so and thus the leader accelerates adoption. This is
similar to our result in the precommitment game with goods that are close substitutes. In
contrast, from Proposition 2(ii) and (iii) that holds here too and Proposition 3(ii), we see that
competition aﬀects negatively ﬁrm 2’s technology adoption incentives.
We should stress that under certain conditions the above described technology diﬀusion
equilibrium is not the unique equilibrium of the preemption game. As demonstrated by Fu-
denberg and Tirole (1980), there could be an another equilibrium too: a joint adoption equi-
librium, in which both ﬁrms adopt the new technology at the same date, τm
1 = τm
2 = τm
J .T h e
exact conditions for its existence are analytically intractable. Still, setting k(t)=e−(α+r)t,w i t h
4Our numerical simulations indicate that Proposition 4(ii) holds also for γ high enough and δ low enough.
13α>0, and using numerical simulations we observe that under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition a necessary condition for the existence of a joint adoption equilibrium is that the
new technology is not too drastic. More speciﬁcally, when δ is low enough then a joint adoption
equilibrium always exists, while when δ takes intermediate values a joint adoption equilibrium
exists only if the goods are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated (γ low). This occurs because when the
new technology is not too drastic (δ low), the best reaction to early adoption is to quickly
follow suit. Since the rival will follow soon, the gains from preemption are low and thus ﬁrm
1’s incentives to adopt before ﬁrm 2 are weak. Firm 1 then prefers to wait and adopt the new
technology much later, and simultaneously with ﬁrm 2, in order to save on adoption costs and
enjoy higher proﬁts. In fact, at the optimal joint adoption date, industry proﬁts are maximized
a n ds h a r e de q u a l l yb e t w e e nﬁrms, such that each ﬁrm obtains proﬁts higher than the leader’s
proﬁts in the precommitment game. The following Proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 5 In the joint adoption equilibrium of the preemption game,
(i) τC
J <τ B





When ﬁrms adopt the technology at the same date, this date is earlier under Cournot than
under Bertrand competition (Proposition 5(i)). This is so because industry proﬁts are higher
under Cournot rather than under Bertrand competition and thus joint adoption incentives are
stronger in the former than in the latter case. Clearly, the optimal joint adoption date is later
than the second adoption date in the technology diﬀusion equilibrium of both the preemption





the follower’s incentives to adopt the new technology are stronger than each ﬁrm’s incentives
when both adopt at the same date. Therefore, late joint adoption maximizes industry’s proﬁts.
4 Socially-Optimal Adoption Timing
In this Section, we investigate the optimal technology adoption pattern from a welfare view-
point and compare it with the adoption patterns that prevail in the market equilibrium. We
deﬁne the per-period gross welfare V as the sum of consumers’ and producers’ surplus. We as-
sume that the social planner is unable to inﬂuence ﬁrms’ behavior in the product market (i.e.,
their price or quantity choices). Thus, we focus throughout on second-best socially optimal
14adoption patterns.
The social planner, taking the market structure as given, chooses the adoption dates so as















b e−rtdt − k(T1) − k(T2), (16)
where V m
0 ≡ V m(c,c), V m
1 ≡ V m(c − ∆,c),a n dV m
b ≡ V m(c − ∆,c− ∆) are respectively the
per-period gross welfare if none, only one, or both ﬁrms have adopted the new technology in
market m,a n d
V m(c1,c 2) ≡ U(qm
1 (c1,c 2),qm
2 (c1,c 2)) − c1qm
1 (c1,c 2) − c2qm
2 (c1,c 2). (17)
The ﬁrst order conditions of (16) are:
V m
1 − V m
0 = −k0(TSm
1 )erTSm
1 and V m





1 ≡ V m
1 − V m
0 and ISm
2 ≡ V m
b − V m
1 be the social planner’s incremental beneﬁts from
ﬁrm 1’s and ﬁrm 2’s technology adoption respectively.




δA2[2(3 + γ)(2 − γ)2 + δ(12 − γ2)]
2(4 − γ2)2 ; (19)
ISC
2 =
δA2[2(3 + γ)(2 − γ)2 + δ(12 − γ2 − 16γ +2 γ3)]
2(4 − γ2)2 . (20)




δA2[2(3 − 2γ)(1 − γ)(2 + γ)2 + δ(12 − 9γ2 +2 γ4)]
2(1 − γ2)(4 − γ2)2 ; (21)
ISB
2 =
δA2[2(3 − 2γ)(1 − γ)(2 + γ)2 + δ(12 − 16γ − 9γ2 +6 γ3 +2 γ4)]
2(1 − γ2)(4 − γ2)2 . (22)
It follows from the above that ISm
i > 0 and ISm
1 >I Sm
2 . Moreover, from (18), we see that
that TSm
i depends only on ISm
i . Given all these and the fact that [−k0(t)ert] is decreasing in t,
15it follows that the socially optimal adoption dates, TSm
1 and TSm
2 ,a r es u c ht h a tTSm
1 <TSm
2 .
In other words, technology diﬀusion is socially optimal.
We turn now to the comparison of the socially optimal adoption pattern with the one that
arises in the market when ﬁrms can precommit to their adoption dates.




(ii) when δ>0.781 then TSm
2 <Tm
2
(iii) when δ<0.781 then there exists γ3(δ) ≡ (2+δ)/2(1+δ),w i t hdγ3/dδ < 0, such that
TSm
2 <Tm
2 if γ<γ 3(δ) and TSm
2 >Tm
2 otherwise. .
Proposition 6(i) states that ﬁrm 1 always adopts the new technology too late in comparison
with the socially optimal adoption date. The reason is that ﬁrm 1 cannot appropriate the full
social surplus generated by the adoption in the market, so it prefers to wait a little longer
when the costs of bringing the new technology on line become lower. This ﬁnding is related
to Dasgupta and Stiglitz’s (1980) observation that non-appropriability of social surplus leads
to underinvestment relative to the social optimum. A similar reasoning applies for ﬁrm 2 too
whenever the new technology is drastic in cost reduction (δ>0.781). As Proposition 6(ii)
states ﬁrm 2 adopts too late as compared with the optimal adoption date in this case too.
Nevertheless, when the new technology is not too drastic (δ<0.781), whether or not
ﬁrm 2 adopts the technology earlier or later than it is socially optimal depends on product
substitutability. According to Proposition 6(iii), if the goods are suﬃciently close substitutes,
ﬁrm 2 adopts the new technology earlier in the market (Cournot or Bertrand) than in the social
optimum.5 The reverse, however, is true if the goods are poor substitutes. The intuition is as
follows. When goods are very poor substitutes, ﬁrm 2 is almost a monopolist in the market and
thus it cannot appropriate the full social surplus generated by the cost-reducing innovation.
As a consequence, it waits relatively longer for the costs of bringing the innovation on line to
decrease suﬃciently to compensate for the part of social surplus which it cannot appropriate.
However, if products are too close substitutes then ﬁrm 2 produces a tiny share before adoption.
Given that almost all production is already done by ﬁrm 1 with the low cost technology, and
that the goods are close substitutes, the adoption of the innovation by ﬁrm 2 increases the
5This condition is satisﬁed whenever, given ∆, the market is not too small.
16social surplus only by little. This is so because the cost-reducing technology applies only to
ﬁrm 2’s tiny production share. On the other hand, innovation increases signiﬁcantly ﬁrm 2’s
share in the market, thus creating a strong incentive to adopt the new technology earlier. This
business-stealing eﬀect dominates the non-appropriability eﬀect when goods are suﬃciently
close substitutes and so ﬁrm 2 in the market adopts earlier than in the second-best optimum.
One might wonder how Cournot and Bertrand adoption patterns compare among them-
selves in terms of social welfare. Numerical simulations indicate that Bertrand competition is
always preferable from a welfare point of view although as we saw in Section 3, the incentives
for technology adoption are sometimes stronger under Cournot competition.6
Next we compare the socially optimal adoption pattern with the ﬁrm’s optimal adoption
pattern in the preemption game. We know from Subsection 3.2 that the per-period preemptive
incentives of ﬁrm 1 are given by πm
l − πm
f and that they increase as the goods become closer
substitutes. Furthermore, from Proposition 2 we know that Tm
2 is typically increasing in γ
under both Bertrand and Cournot competition, i.e., the closer substitutes the two goods are,
the later ﬁrm 2 adopts the new technology in the market. It can also be checked from (19) and
(21) that ∂ISm
1 /∂γ < 0 except if γ is too high, m = B,C. Thus as the goods become closer
substitutes the social planner typically postpones adoption. All these lead us to the following
conjecture: Firm 1 adopts the technology earlier in the technology diﬀusion equilibrium of
the preemptiom game than in the second-best optimum, i.e., τC
1 <T SC
1 , when the goods
are suﬃciently close substitutes. Setting k(t)=e−(α+r)t and using numerical simulations, we
conﬁrm that this is indeed the case.
Regarding the date of the second adoption as it was pointed out in Subsection 3.2 ﬁrm 2
adopts the technology in the technology diﬀusion equilibrium of preemption game at the same
date as in the precommitment game. Thus, Proposition 6(ii) and (iii) holds here too. Similarly
also to the precommitment game numerical simulations indicate that in the technology diﬀu-
sion equilibrium of the preemption game welfare is always higher under Bertrand than under
Cournot competition.
Turning to the comparison of the socially optimal adoption pattern with the ﬁrms’ optimal
adoption pattern in the other possible type of equilibrium in the preemption game, the joint
adoption equilibrium, we ﬁnd that when the new technology is not too drastic (δ<0.781)
6Numerical simulations are available from the authors upon request.
17the market leads to a later adoption than it is socially-optimal, TSm
2 <τ m
J .T h i si sn o tv e r y
surprising since as we saw in the discussion of Proposition 5, the new technology is adopted
q u i t el a t ew h e nﬁrm 1 forsakes its incentive to preempt ﬁrm 2.
Regarding policy implications, it follows from the above discussion that when ﬁrms can
precommit to their adoption dates then the subsidization of ﬁrm 1’s adoption is a welfare-
improving policy regardless of the mode of market competition. When instead ﬁrms are unable
to precommit and their products are close substitutes the optimal policy, both under Bertrand
and Cournot competition, is to tax the ﬁrst adopter. The optimal policy towards ﬁrm 2’s
adoption, subsidization or taxation, is also the same under both modes of market competition.
Surprisingly then the qualitative features of the comparison between the social optimal and the
market adoption patterns are similar under Cournot and Bertrand competition despite the fact
that technology adoption creates a positive strategic eﬀect in Cournot and a negative strategic
eﬀect in Bertrand competition. Yet, the optimal adoption level of subsidy or tax depends on
the mode of market competition as well as on a number of other market characteristics such
as product substitutability γ and the relative eﬀectiveness of the new technology δ.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have explored the impact of market competition on ﬁrms’ incentives to adopt
a cost-reducing technology. We have also compared the private and the public incentives for
technology adoption.
We have found that diﬀerences in market structures, in terms of product substitutability
or mode of competition, generate signiﬁcant diﬀerences in ﬁrms’ technology adoption patterns.
In particular, the latter diﬀer not only among symmetric ﬁrms (i.e., there is technology diﬀu-
sion), but most importantly among markets with Cournot and Bertrand competition and with
diﬀerent degrees of product substitutability. We have also found that an increase in compe-
tition, captured either by a shift from Cournot to Bertrand competition or by an increase in
product substitutability, can discourage technology adoption. This holds always for the ﬁrm
that adopts the technology second. It also holds for the ﬁrm that adopts the technology ﬁrst
as long as ﬁrms can precommit to their adoption dates and their products are suﬃciently dif-
ferentiated. Our ﬁndings point out that the relationship between competition toughness and
adoption incentives is not always monotonic. Moreover, they give rise to a number of testable
18implications regarding the role that the distinct market features play in determining the timing
of technology adoption.
Comparing the market adoption pattern with the socially optimal one, we have provided
a number of insights for the design of technology policy aiming at correcting the market
ineﬃciencies. We have found that whether a social planner should tax or subsidize technology
adoption depends crucially on ﬁrms’ ﬂexibility to alter their adoption plans as well as on
product substitutability. The mode of competition, Bertrand or Cournot, should not aﬀect
qualitatively the appropriate policy measures. However, it should be taken into account along
with other market features, such as the eﬀectiveness of the new technology, while choosing the
optimal level of the tax or subsidy applied.
This paper has improved our understanding on how product market competition inﬂu-
ences the private and public incentives to adopt a new technology. Yet, it has done so with-
out considering a number of other factors, such as the uncertainty about the new technol-
ogy’s eﬀectiveness, the length of time required for its successful implementation (Reinganum,
1983a&b, Stenbacka and Tombak, 1994) and the possibilities of imitation and licensing (Katz
and Shapiro, 1987). Introducing one or more of these factors into our framework will provide
further insights into the design of the technology policy, a task left for future research.
6A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
(i) From (11) and (13), it follows that IC
1 >I B
1 i fa n do n l yi f[((2 − γ) − γ(1 + δ))δγ3/(1 −
γ2)(4 − γ2)2] > 0, or equivalently if and only if [(1/(1 + δ)) > (γ/(2 − γ))]. The latter is true
i fa n do n l yi fγ<γ 1(δ) ≡ 2/(2 + δ).I tc a nb ec h e c k e dt h a tγ1(δ) <γ B(δ) for all δ. Clearly,
∂γ1
∂δ < 0.
(ii) From (12) and (14), it follows that IC
2 >I B
2 i fa n do n l yi f[(2(1 − γ)+( 2− γ)δ)δγ3/(1 −
γ2)(4 − γ2)2] > 0. The latter is always true since both its numerator and denominator are
positive. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
(i) Diﬀerentiating (11) in terms of γ,
∂IC
1




2[2 + δ −
p










∂γ < 0 if γ<γ C
2 (δ). It can be checked that γC
2 (δ) <γ B(δ)
for all δ. Therefore,
∂TC
1












∂γ =0 , we see that there exists γB
2 (δ)7, such that
∂IB
1





∂γ < 0 if γ<γ B
2 (δ). It can be checked that γB








∂γ ≥ 0 otherwise.
(ii) Diﬀerentiating (12) in terms of γ, it can be checked that
∂IB
2
∂γ < 0 for all permissible γ and







∂γ =0in terms of γ,w eﬁnd:
b γC
2 (δ)=
2[2 + δ −
p




2 (0) = 0.667 and db γC
2 /dδ > 0. It can be checked that b γC
2 (δ) <γ B(δ) only if δ<
0.281.Therefore, for all δ>0.281,
∂IC
2
∂γ < 0 and thus
∂TC
2








∂γ < 0 if γ<b γC
2 (δ).T h u s ,
∂TC
2






2 (δ). The above imply that
∂TC
2
∂γ < 0 only if δ<0.281 and γ>0.667. ¥
Lemma 1









which is increasing in γ and δ. ¥




e−rt1 − e−rt2 and g(t)=k(t)ert.( 2 3 )




e−r(t1+t2)[g0(t)(er(t2−t1) − 1) + r(g(t1) − g(t2))]
(e−rt1 − e−rt2)2 . (24)










20strictly decreasing and strictly convex, the right hand side of (24) in square brackets [...] <
r[g0(t1)(t2 − t1)+g(t1) − g(t2)] < 0.T h u s , f(t1,t 2) is decreasing in t1 and in t2 by the




2 ). Then, from (15) and Lemma





2 ,m= B,C, this is straightforward from Proposition 1(ii). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4
(i) From (15) we know that πm
l − πm
f = f(t1,t 2)=r
k(t1)−k(t2)
e−rt1−e−rt2,w i t h
∂f
∂ti < 0,i=1 ,2 (see














where dt2 = ∂t2

















∂γ > 0. We also know from Proposition 2(ii) that under
Bertrand competition that TB
2 is always increasing in γ; that is, ∂t2
∂γ > 0 for all γ and δ.T h u s ,
the numerator of the right-hand side of (25) is positive. Since its denominator is negative, it
follows that dt1
dγ < 0 for all permissible γ and δ, i.e. τB
1 is decreasing in γ.
(ii) Under Cournot competition, we know from Proposition 2(iii) that TC
2 is increasing in
γ except if γ is suﬃciently large and δ is suﬃciently small; that is, ∂t2
∂γ > 0 under these
conditions. It follows that suﬃcient conditions for the numerator of the right-hand side of (25)
to be positive is that either δ>0.281 or γ<b γC
2 (δ) for δ<0.281. Under these parameter
values, and since the denominator is negative, it is necessarily true that dt1
dγ < 0,i . e . τC
1 is
decreasing in γ. For the rest of the parameter values, our simulations indicate that it is still
true that τC
1 is decreasing in γ. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5




substituting (5) into Im
J , it follows that the incremental beneﬁts under Cournot competition
are:
IC
J = A2δ(2 + δ)
(2 + γ)2.
21Similarly, substituting (7) into Im
J , we obtain the incremental beneﬁts under Bertrand compe-
tition:
IB
J = A2δ(2 + δ)(1 − γ)
(2 − γ)2(1 + γ)
.
Taking their diﬀerence, we have:
IC
J − IB
J = A2 δ(2 + δ)2γ3




J . This implies in turn that τC
J <τ B
J .
(ii) We know that Tm












J . We also know that πm
b <π m
0 . Thus, Im
J <I m
2 . This means
in turn that τm
J >Tm
2 . ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6
(i) From (11) and (19), we have that ISC
1 >I C
1 i fa n do n l yi f[(2(1 − γ)+δ)/2(4 − γ2)] > 0.
This is true for all γ and δ. Also, from (13) and (21), we have that ISB
1 >I B
1 if and only if
[(2(1−γ)+δ)/2(4−γ2)(1−γ2)] > 0, which is again always true. Then, from (10) and (18) and





(ii) - (iii) From (12) and (20), ISC
2 >I C
2 i fa n do n l yi f[(1 + (1 − 2γ)(1 + δ))/2(4 − γ2)] > 0,
which is true for γ<γ 3(δ) ≡ 2+δ
2(1+δ). Also, from (14) and (22), we have that ISB
2 >I B
2 if and
only if [(1 + (1 − 2γ)(1 + δ)/2(4 − γ2)(1 − γ2)] > 0, which is again always true for γ<γ 3(δ).
It can be checked that γ3(δ) <γ B(δ) only if δ<0.781. Hence, ISm
2 >I m
2 for all δ>0.781.
Then, from (10) and (18) and our assumption that −k ´( t)e−rt is decreasing in t, it follows that
TSm
2 <Tm
2 for all δ>0.781. On the other hand, if δ<0.781, then TSm
2 >Tm
2 for all γ>γ 3(δ)
and TSm
2 <Tm
2 for all γ<γ 3(δ). ¥
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